Aim: The blockchain is a neutral platform capable of programmable value transfer in a way that has requires minimal trust assumptions on counterparties. We seek to make use of these properties to provide affordable dispute resolution that can offer an attractive alternative to traditional arbitration mechanisms and small-claims courts. Specifically, in the context of hiring contractors and freelancers, payment can be escrowed in a smart contract that executes depending on whether the freelancer has deemed to have done adequate work, where this decision should ideally also be decentralized.

Method: I will present Kleros, a decentralized blockchain-based dispute resolution platform, which draws on game theory, specifically Schelling points, to incentivize crowdsourced jurors to honestly rule on disputes. A number of interesting research problems arise in establishing the security properties and developing extensions of this system. Of particular interest are ideas from the theory of voting systems and tactical voting that are relevant when the crowdsources jurors are presented more than two options.

Results: I will discuss several results exploring the security of Kleros against various attacks under different assumptions on the resources of attackers and rationality of jurors.

Conclusion: Dispute resolution is a particular application of blockchain's capacity along with well-designed incentive structures to solve coordination problems.